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Abstract. We outline a vision for an ambitious program to understand
the economy and ﬁnancial markets as a complex evolving system of
coupled networks of interacting agents. This is a completely diﬀerent
vision from that currently used in most economic models. This view
implies new challenges and opportunities for policy and managing eco-
nomic crises. The dynamics of such models inherently involve sudden
and sometimes dramatic changes of state. Further, the tools and ap-
proaches we use emphasize the analysis of crises rather than of calm
periods. In this they respond directly to the calls of Governors Bernanke
and Trichet for new approaches to macroeconomic modelling.
1 Visionary approach
In November 2010, European Central Bank (ECB) then Governor Jean-Claude
Trichet opened the ECBs ﬂagship annual Central Banking Conference with a challenge
to the scientiﬁc community to develop radically new approaches to understanding the
economy:
When the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and ﬁnancial models
immediately became apparent. Macro models failed to predict the crisis and seemed in-
capable of explaining what was happening to the economy in a convincing manner. As
a policy-maker during the crisis, I found the available models of limited help. In fact,
I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools.
. . . we need to develop complementary tools to improve the robustness of our overall
framework. In this context, I would very much welcome inspiration from other disciplines:
physics, engineering, psychology, biology. Bringing experts from these ﬁelds together with
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economists and central bankers is potentially very creative and valuable. Scientists have
developed sophisticated tools for analysing complex dynamic systems in a rigorous way.
These models have proved helpful in understanding many important but complex phe-
nomena: epidemics, weather patterns, crowd psychology, magnetic ﬁelds.
An important component of the FuturICT proposal will be to deliver the comple-
mentary tools that Governor Trichet is calling for. The FuturICT project will exploit
the rapidly expanding capacity of ICT to develop a system to continuously monitor
and evaluate the social and economic states of European countries and their vari-
ous components, and, what is of particular importance for this discussion, the real
economy, the governmental sector, the banking and ﬁnance sector, by developing and
managing a massive repository of high-quality data in all economic and ﬁnancial
areas; This will provide a platform for the development and application of data
mining, process mining, computational and artiﬁcial intelligence and every other com-
puter and complex science technique coupled with economic theory and econometric
methods that can be devoted to identifying the emergence of social and economic
risks, instabilities and crises; FuturICT will provide the framework and infrastructure
to perform what-if analysis, scenario evaluations and computational experiments to
inform decision makers and help develop innovative policy, market and regulation de-
signs. This will involve pushing the envelope of what is technologically possible, using
new information and computational capabilities to greatly expand the state of the art
in the collection and modelling of data, at a hitherto unprecedented scale. Perhaps as
important we shall investigate the impact that new information technologies, coupled
with a natural tendency of market participants to “herd”, has had on the evolution
of ﬁnancial market prices. As Governor Bernanke said:
“The brief market plunge was just an example of how complex and chaotic, in a formal
sense, these systems have become ... What happened in the stock market is just a little
example of how things can cascade, or how technology can interact with market panic”
(Interview with Ben Bernanke, the IHT May 17th 2010).
The only way to make a major advance in economic modelling is to explore entirely
new approaches rather than make incremental modiﬁcations to existing models. The
economic models developed will be tightly integrated with the broader sociological
modelling eﬀort of FuturICT. Such an approach will take us away from the comfort-
able belief that the macroeconomy is well understood and that only occasional shocks
perturb it. To quote Lord Turner, head of the U.K. ﬁnancial services authority:
“But there is also a strong belief, which I share, that bad or rather over-simplistic and
overconﬁdent economics helped create the crisis. There was a dominant conventional
wisdom that markets were always rational and self-equilibrating, that market completion
by itself could ensure economic eﬃciency and stability, and that ﬁnancial innovation and
increased trading activity were therefore axiomatically beneﬁcial”.
The purpose of our project is precisely to take up Lord Turner’s challenge and to build
models and perform analysis of the economy as a complex system prone to sudden
and major changes of endogenous origin. Our analysis will also show that the blind
faith that has been put on the capacity of markets to self-organise in a stable way is
misplaced. Better approaches, such as those we suggest, can help understand intrinsic
fragilities of the economic system and help to provide appropriate policy measures to
mitigate them.
1.1 Goals
We intend to use new tools in information and communication technologies to imple-
ment an integrated complex systems approach for understanding ﬁnancial markets
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and the economy. This includes the collection of new data, new methods of empirical
analysis, and the development of new mathematical and computational tools. This
eﬀort will be guided by emerging new conceptual paradigms such as network theory,
market ecology, behavioural economics and agent-based modelling, and empirically
grounded by laboratory experiments and micro data. By combining these ideas into
a practical simulation and forecasting tool our goal is to build the foundations of a
new paradigm within economics.
1.1.1 Modelling the economy as a complex evolving network
The view of the economy as a complex system is at least as old as Adam Smith, who
(though not in these words) described the economy and the social welfare that it cre-
ates, as an emergent process based on the self-organized behaviour of independently
acting, self-motivated individuals. Speciﬁc examples of complex systems in social and
economic contexts include traﬃc ﬂows, large supply chains, ﬁnancial markets, group
dynamics and crowd behaviour. Examples of pioneering papers which view socio-
economic issues as complex systems are in [5,10].
Complex systems, which predominate in modern socio-economic systems, raise a
daunting set of problems requiring new and innovative approaches. These systems
are made up of a large number of interacting individual elements, such as people,
companies, countries, cars. They challenge conventional thinking. For example, they
are dynamic rather than static. They are probabilistic and not deterministic. They
appear to very diﬃcult to predict and control, and are permeated by non-linear or
network interactions amongst the component agents. The individual elements of a
system are inﬂuenced directly by the behaviour of the system as a whole, and at the
same time their interactions lead to the emergent behaviour at the aggregate level
of the system. The ‘common sense’ connection between the size of an event and its
consequences no longer holds. Small changes have the capacity to trigger large scale
events [an early demonstration of this is [103].
Complex systems are characterised by critical points and regime shifts, an example
being public opinion and pro- and anti-war views, attitudes towards smoking bans,
and so on. From a policy perspective, these features can lead to serious malfunctioning
of the system caused by cascades across the network of the system. Examples include
epidemic spreading, the spreading of congestion, power blackouts and the collapse of
the interbank market.
Extreme events in such systems are observed much more often than is suggested by
the standard assumption in applied econometric work that data follow the Gaussian,
or normal, distribution. The frequency and sizes of ﬂoods, earthquakes, wars, ﬁnancial
asset prices and even economic recessions are characterised by highly non-Gaussian
outcomes [82].
Techniques used in the analysis of complex systems are quite diﬀerent from those
used in conventional economic theory, with its emphasis on optimisation. They include
data mining, network analysis, systems dynamics, agent based modelling, non-linear
dynamics, catastrophe theory and the theory of critical phenomena. Much of our
emphasis in extending economic theory is on agent based modelling, given that the
economy is made up of interacting individual agents (people, ﬁrms, regulators, gov-
ernments), each with the capacity to act with purpose and intent, each of which is
acting in the context of networks in which the fundamental behaviour of the agent is
not ﬁxed, but which evolves in response to the behaviour of others.
The network view. One of the biggest successes of the complex systems
approach has been the development of techniques for studying systems in terms of
network models. Economics provides a rich set of networks to consider, in which the
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nodes can be many things. Examples that have already received considerable atten-
tion include interbank lending [22,23,45,62–64], international trade [57,58], corporate
ownership [15,17,101,102], and input-output relationships in production [31]. There
remain many more relationships to be studied. Most importantly, these networks all
interact with each other, and these interactions remain unexplored. The analysis of
coupled networks is at the forefront of network theory [29,72].
The vision of the economy as a system of evolving coupled networks provides a
completely diﬀerent policy perspective. A key feature is that the behaviour of the
economy at the aggregate level emerges from the interactions, both of the individuals
within each network and of the networks themselves.
Traditional policy recommendations are based on the reactions of individual nodes
(people, ﬁrms, institutions) to changes in policy. The network approach we propose
opens up the possibility of identifying and targeting key nodes within the system,
thereby potentially increasing the eﬀectiveness of policy. It further makes it possible
for policy makers to inﬂuence the way in which the structure of the network evolves.
So, for example, the Basel agreements have focused upon controlling and improving
the viability of individual institutions rather than on the ways in which they are
connected and hence the viability and resilience of the system as a whole. A classic
example of the failure of this approach was that of Dexia, a Belgian bank which had to
be rescued by government intervention only 3 months after having passed the oﬃcial
stress tests without any problem. For example, a complex systems network analysis
can yield insights into the systemic banks in the ﬁnancial network, which must be
preserved from falling. These latter considerations have only recently come to the
fore. This point has been heavily emphasized by the Bank of England (see [52] and
[53]), but despite the establishment of the European Systemic Risk board there has
been little reaction in terms of macroeconomic modelling to this issue.
The growth and evolution of the economy is reﬂected in the growth and evolution
of these networks. The ﬂuctuations and changes in the networks during the business
cycle potentially give a much ﬁner grained view of state changes in the economy than
a few aggregate numbers such as GDP and unemployment. So far this remains almost
unexplored territory.
FuturICT will provide a platform with the raw data needed to construct these
networks, and to develop the tools to visualize them and analyze their interactions,
growth and dynamics. It will provide the capability to do this ﬂexibly, focusing on a
given set of issues and the networks that are relevant for those issues.
Understanding network structure. A key aspect of the project will be the use
of ICT tools to obtain information both on the structure of relevant networks at a
point in time, as well as to monitor how they evolve over time. The models which
are built must incorporate the key features of the network topologies, and have be-
havioural rules of agents which allow the structure to evolve over time. In particular,
what was thought of as the key feature of ﬁnancial networks, their connectivity, has
to be supplemented by other network characteristics, such as degree distribution and
clustering, which may provide indications of fragility.
In other words, by examining the evolution of several key characteristics, we aim
to understand the dynamics of the networks. How do the networks change in time
and what causes such changes? In an economic system this inevitably requires an un-
derstanding of the agents who make the decisions that cause the networks to change,
though again it has to be emphasized that these decisions are not taken in isolation
and are linked to those of other actors in the system.
Agent-based models are the natural tool for simulating complex systems in social
science. In comparison to econometric models or the DSGE models of mainstream eco-
nomics, which are formulated in terms of aggregate quantities, agent-based modelling
is done at a microscopic level. Agent-based models operate at the level of individuals,
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who can be householders, decision makers at ﬁrms, or government regulators. Agent-
based models make use of computer power to represent as many diﬀerent agents as
are needed. They do not rely on complex mathematical derivations or closed form
solutions. This makes it easy to implement nonlinear behaviour without restrictions
on the degree of realism. Oﬀ course stylized agent-based models, where (partial) an-
alytical results are available are a valuable and complementary tool that can yield
important insights.
In recent years behavioural economists have made great strides in understanding
how real people behave in economic contexts. Agent-based modelling works hand-in-
hand with behavioural economics, incorporating its insights to model the decision-
making of agents, and using the power of the computer to simulate their behaviour in
the complex interacting coupled networks discussed above, to keep track of their in-
teractions through their consumption, production, budgets, borrowing, lending, ﬂows
of goods and services, investment, trading, etc.
1.1.2 Data and ICT-tools
The economy generates vast amounts of data that are currently not being gathered
and recorded in an integrated manner, and which can provide much deeper insight into
the workings of the economy than existing data sources. Most current data collection
in economics is geared for econometric and DSGE models, which only require ag-
gregate data such as GDP, unemployment, etc. Network modelling and agent-based
modelling, in contrast, are best done with ﬁner grained data, such as information
about the choices of individual householders. Information about the heterogeneity of
behaviour is essential. Agent-based models can potentially make use of many diﬀerent
types of information, as described below.
The data collection that we propose here is motivated by the complex systems
picture of the world economy presented earlier. In order to construct the coupled net-
works that make up the economy, and in order to validate and calibrate agent-based
models that quantitatively describe the interactions that take place within these net-
works, we must collect detailed data. It is beyond the scope of this position paper
to present a comprehensive plan of what should be collected and how it should be
collected, but we give some examples to give the reader a feeling for the philosophy
and the scope of what we have in mind. It is perhaps in this area more than any other
where ICT makes a crucial contribution.
The data that one would like to obtain in order to get a realistic picture of
the economy includes trades in ﬁnancial markets with identity information, interna-
tional trade, ﬁrm transactions (invoices and receipts), credit networks, transactions
by individual consumers, and electronic text from the internet and other sources.
While some of these data are already collected in piecemeal form, much of it is never
collected or recorded, and even when it is, it is often not available or easily usable by
researchers.
A simple example is given by trading on the foreign exchange market. Whilst
traders can potentially trade with thousands of other traders they, in fact, trade with
very few others. Getting data for the structure of the clustering of trading would be
very useful for understanding the evolution of prices on this market.
In another direction, one of the breakthroughs in economics in the last few decades
is the advent of economic experiments. ICT technology potentially enables this to be
done more eﬃciently, more comprehensively, and on much larger scales, either through
use of the web or through use of technology that allows volunteers to be monitored
in their daily life, or data on activity such as cell phone usage to be anonymously
monitored.
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Ultimately the economy is about the transformation of physical materials into
manufactured goods, and the organizing of human activity into services. On a longer
timescale, data concerning products, technologies and ﬁrms should be recorded so
that we can understand more directly how the economy transforms human activity
into material goods, information and services. (Here we deﬁne “technology” in a very
broad way, to include everything from electronics to new ﬁnancial instruments to
changes in the legal system).
Financial markets. There are hundreds of millions of trades a day in ﬁnancial
markets. In foreign exchange markets alone almost three trillion euro are traded
every day, about 25 times the daily world GDP. From the point of view of economic
theory it remains a mystery why there should be so much trading. Why are foreign
exchange markets so active? How much of this is due to real economic activity, and
how much is speculation? To what extent do speculators play a useful role in setting
exchange rates, and to what extent do they act to destabilize them? As already
mentioned mapping the networks of traders would contribute to our understanding
of the functioning of these markets.
We believe that to get proper answers to these questions one has to collaborate
with selected governments and exchanges to obtain such data for some of the major
markets in Europe, to make it completely anonymous and make it available. This
could lead to a break-through in understanding how markets really function and
what drives instabilities.
Inter-firm transactions and international trade. There exist substantial data
sets documenting international trade. However, these data are typically highly aggre-
gated and contain inadequate detail about the ﬁrms doing the trading and the prod-
ucts being traded. They are also not well integrated with data on domestic trades.
One would like a much more ﬁne-grained and textured view, integrated together
with other data that can put such data in perspective and illuminate the underlying
interactions.
For example, to document real economic activity one would like a record of the
invoices and receipts of companies. Each invoice and receipt is for a particular prod-
uct or service. If one had a record of invoices and receipts, one would have a detailed
record of economic activity, a record of what is made, where it is made, and who
makes it, making it possible to track the inputs and outputs of economic production
at a detailed level. Most importantly, such a record would chronicle the interactions
between diﬀerent goods, and between goods and services. For example a large part
of the trade between the countries of the EU is made up of goods which at an aggre-
gate level are the same. Germany, France and Italy export cars to each other. Only a
much ﬁner categorisation of these goods will lead to a satisfactory explanation of this
trade. Such data may be collected directly or indirectly. For example when goods are
imported or exported they are insured and the insurance policy records the nature of
the goods and their value.
While it is beyond the scope of even this project to collect such data comprehen-
sively, by working together with a selected group of the largest international ﬁrms,
and with cooperation (and some pressure) from the governments of a few EU coun-
tries, one could begin collecting such data and, by so doing, illustrate its power for
getting a more fundamental understanding of how the economy grows and why such
growth ﬂuctuates in time. This could also be put together with ﬁnancial and banking
transactions to better understand the linkages within the economy.
Credit networks. The recent crisis made it clear how essential credit is to the
functioning of the entire economy. It also made it clear how poor our information
is about credit – the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, for example, did
not have the ability to track U.S. credit markets during the crisis, even though they
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have regulatory authority over U.S. banks. This has triggered a big push by central
banks around the world to have better capabilities for tracking credit markets, and
is leading to the collection of new data sets. The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank now has,
for example, a detailed record of the transactions of all the commercial banks in the
US on a minute by minute basis. Similar data collection projects are underway by
the Bank of England and the European Central Bank.
There are serious conﬁdentiality problems with public access of these data sets.
We believe, however, that by working in partnership with these banks to create data
which has been made completely anonymous, it should be possible to make useful
data about credit networks available to researchers.
Transactions by individual consumers. There are billions of consumer trans-
actions everyday. These are increasingly being recorded in electronic form, which
provides an enormous opportunity to understand consumer behaviour. Many retail
ﬁrms analyze these in detail to better understand how to market their goods; this
unfortunately is also an impediment because it means that these data sets have con-
siderable proprietary value. While some analysis has been published in the marketing
literature, a great deal remains to be done. We intend to develop collaborations with
retail ﬁrms to develop the potential of these data.
Electronic text. One of the central lessons of economics is that expectations are
important. Unfortunately, however, they are very diﬃcult to measure. The current
method for measuring expectations is through surveys, but this method is slow, expen-
sive, time consuming, and unless done very carefully, statistically unreliable. Modern
ICT technology presents us with a much more eﬃcient alternative: The modern world
abounds in electronic text ﬂows. These include an enormous number of internet sites,
news, social media such as twitter, and mobile phone texting. By gathering this data
and developing better methods for text analysis we have the potential to measure
expectations in real time. Such measurements could be extremely useful for economic
modelling, for example to monitor sentiment and make use of this in agent-based
models.
Individual expectations are inﬂuenced by beliefs and opinions of other individuals
through social networks. This raises the issue of contagion and the pace of diﬀusion
of expectations and beliefs through social networks, which needs to be taken into
account in agent-based models.
1.2 Opportunities
At the outset we quoted Governor Trichet, who has issued a challenge to create
new tools for understanding the economy. Such tools will be designed to answer the
questions of most interest to policy makers. The agent-based complexity models that
we are proposing will provide an alternative method for answering these questions,
that will give a diﬀerent perspective than current models. There are two standard
approaches. Firstly there are econometric, or time series models which seek to ﬁnd
structure in the macroeconomic data for economies. Secondly, dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models, which are the benchmark of modern macro-
economics. These are based on the rational economic individual who is capable of
understanding the evolution of the economy and acting accordingly.
We intend to base our models on a very diﬀerent vision. Under our approach indi-
viduals may have varying information, depending on what is behaviorally plausible.
Aggregate phenomena are generated by the interaction of such individuals, who inﬂu-
ence each other and interact with each other. Such an approach requires intensive use
of ICT both for simulating our models and for gathering the data against which to test
them. To this end, an important goal of FuturICT is to build a “ﬂight simulator” for
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policy makers that can be used to obtain experience in managing ﬁnancial-economic
crises. The simulator that will be built will use advanced ICT-tools collecting real
data and having state of the art graphics, to make it easy to visualize what the simu-
lator is doing and what the outcomes of the simulation and diﬀerent policy measures
are.
An additional and important by-product of our project will be the increased
accessibility of the data that we gather. As it becomes available this will enable a
much wider audience to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the nature
and evolution of our socio-economic systems.
1.3 Challenges
The grand challenge for us here is to greatly expand the state of the art in economic
analysis and forecasting by using agent-based complexity models, along with integra-
tion of real-time data and real-time simulation through advanced ICT tools, to enable
policy makers to monitor the global economy and detect potential crises in an early
stage and to develop tools to prevent them. Particular challenges that stand out are
the following:
1.3.1 Financial stability
An important challenge for FuturICT is to explore the (in)stability and resilience of
global ﬁnancial markets focussing on issues of agent heterogeneity, network eﬀects,
spreading of information, market psychology, social learning, and expectations. At the
same time, many instabilities in ﬁnancial markets are driven by nonlinear instabilities
that are inherently mechanical or that derive from market structure. (Good exam-
ples are nonlinear instabilities driven by derivatives ([25], [79], or leverage ([97], [44],
[25]). We will use the complex systems network approach to understand the nonlinear
feedbacks that exist in markets more comprehensively, explore their interactions with
each other, and in particular to model their interactions with human decision making.
There are many questions to be addressed with this approach: What are the causes
of extreme events and crises? What preventive measures should be taken? If a cri-
sis does occur, how should it be managed from a complexity perspective? What is
the role of ﬁnancial innovation? How can institutional design and market regulation
contribute to the stability and resilience of global ﬁnancial markets? It is now widely
believed that modern markets have become much more vulnerable to sudden changes
as a result of the development of automatic trading algorithms. The latter, for ex-
ample, often incorporate stop loss instructions to sell when a price descends to a
certain level. If many algorithms have the same thresholds this can lead to a cascade
of sales as in May 2010 on the NYSE. This interaction between modern technology
and market dynamics will play an essential role in the way FuturICT models ﬁnancial
markets. A question that is now being treated in a rather pragmatic way is how to
limit the impact of automatic trading algorithms on price dynamics. This project
will make concrete proposals as to how to do this without disrupting basic market
functions.
1.3.2 Macrostability
Macroeconomics and business cycles have been studied for a long time but what we
are proposing is a new perspective. A macroeconomy is a complex system, and current
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economics lacks a satisfactory theory of the sort of ﬂuctuations in economic activ-
ity that are empirically observed. The EU macroeconomy is a multi-scale complex
system of interacting national economies, where problems of small countries (Greece,
Ireland, Portugal) may contagiously spread and threaten macrostability of big coun-
tries (Germany, France, UK) and even the global EU and world economy.
Once we accept that the volatility of ﬁnancial markets is liable to increase rapidly
from time to time without any exogenous shock, then we need to examine proposals
that are deliberately designed to mitigate volatility. A case in point is the “Tobin Tax”
on ﬁnancial transactions. The basic argument is extremely simple: Adding friction will
hinder large amounts of short term trades for very small proﬁts. The assumption here
is that such trades are destabilising, but this has to be shown, and the experience
with markets where this tax exists already is inconclusive. Some have argued that
it will almost certainly decrease liquidity by reducing market making, and therefore
increase volatility. The Taiwan Stock Market, for example, has a substantial Tobin
tax (25 basis points) and is among the most volatile. Thus, although the tax is being
widely proposed as a way to reduce volatility in markets, the results of implementing
it are far from obvious. This is just the kind of question that we intend to address
using agent-based complexity modelling.
The current crisis has shown once more the importance of the feedback between
the macro economy and worldwide ﬁnancial markets. The global economy is a multi-
scale complex system and a multi-disciplinary approach is necessary to study its
functioning. In particular, interactions and feedbacks between ﬁnancial markets and
the macro economy need to be studied to understand crises and improve their early
detection and to develop new complexity based economic policy.
1.3.3 Expectations and learning in a complex economy
Expectations feedback and adaptive behaviour through learning are key ingredients
distinguishing socio-economic systems from complex systems in the natural sciences.
In economics the “particles think”: They learn from experience and adapt their be-
haviour accordingly. A socio-economic complex system is an expectations feedback
system between individual learning and emerging aggregate behaviour. A fundamen-
tal question is: What is the relationship between heterogeneous individual learning
at the micro level and the emerging aggregate macro behaviour which it co-creates?
This fundamental question may be addressed with stylized agent-based models with
few agent types, to get insights in the interactions of heterogeneous rules and their
aggregate behaviour. But a daunting challenge is to address interaction through sim-
ulations incorporating thousands or millions of highly heterogeneous agents, which
do not reduce to simulation of interacting populations of a few types of agents, using
advanced ICT tools and programming levels.
An empirically grounded theory of heterogeneous individual expectations and so-
cial learning is needed as a foundation for a complexity research programme in eco-
nomics. Empirical testing of such a theory, both at the micro and at the macro level
– through laboratory, ﬁeld and web experiments and in empirical ﬁnancial-economic
data – should yield key insights into which emerging patterns are most likely to occur
in complex economic environments and how policy makers can manage expectations
driven socio-economic complex systems.
1.3.4 Inequality
Where does inequality come from? The core model of modern economics, general
equilibrium theory, does not enable us to say anything about the distribution of
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income. The issue of inequality cannot even be addressed in the standard representa-
tive agent model in macro. Is inequality a inherent feature of complex systems with
heterogeneous agents? But inequality is not just a matter of the distributions of in-
come and wealth. A major concern of policy makers about, say, outcomes in health
care or education across hospitals and schools is that such outcomes are “unequal”
or “inequitable” in the key sense that they diﬀer at any point in time. This seems
inevitable in any complex system of interacting agents, but it is often a major concern
to voters and hence to politicians.
Inequality also has an important geographical (e.g. North-South) component,
which poses an additional challenge. Simulations should include agents that live in
heterogeneous environments.
Distributional properties have an important impact on aggregate economic out-
comes; for instance, it is well-known that the eﬀectiveness of tax-cut policies aimed
at sustaining consumption demand depends on the income distribution of tax
payers. Other distributional issues are probably still undervalued in economics, as
for instance the distribution of debt among and within the diﬀerent sectors of the
economy: public, corporate and households.
Policy makers face the problem of predicting and controlling distribution in an
economy. For example, what are the best strategies to achieve a more egalitarian
society, given recent ﬁndings by British sociologists [104]? Agent-based models natu-
rally take into account the distribution of economic variables at individual levels and
therefore can be valuable tools for policy design. A particularly important question
is that of intergenerational inequality. To what extent should we make changes now
to protect future generations?
1.3.5 Sustainability
The problem of protecting both current and future generations is manifest when
considering the supply of food, water and energy, and understanding how we can
maintain a high standard of living for the whole world without depleting natural re-
sources and destroying biodiversity. How do we avoid or at least mitigate these key
social, economic and security-related problems? These extremely diﬃcult problems
require trans-disciplinary teams and play to the strengths of FuturICT.
At present the state of the art for understanding the dynamic aspects of sustain-
ability is system dynamics modelling, as used in the original Club of Rome study,
Limits to Growth. Such models have certainly been useful in providing an under-
standing of the relationships between key components of earth systems. FuturICT
will expand considerably the analytical techniques which are applied to such systems,
beyond that of ordinary diﬀerential equations. For example, network theory, complex
systems theory, multi-agent simulations, multi-level models, experiments and partici-
patory platforms. We also take into account explicitly spatial and network eﬀects, as
well as heterogeneity of agents and randomness. FuturICT will also use new methods
of investigation such as the Living Earth Simulator, the Planetary Nervous System,
the Global Participatory Platform and Interactive Exploratories.
Another important area is climate mitigation. What are the optimal strategies to
deal with climate change itself and its consequences, and how much will they cost?
Current climate mitigation models assume general equilibrium. Production decisions
maximize the utility of a representative agent, a typical person who exempliﬁes the
average worker and consumer. Such models assume full employment and assume that
ﬁrms have no unused inventories – everything that is produced is consumed. Since
by assumption industries operate at full capacity there is no need to stimulate de-
mand. Such models count the costs of converting to new technologies without giving
Participatory Science and Computing for Our Complex World 305
any weight to the economic stimulus that such conversions might generate, i.e. they
do not allow for the possibility that developing new technologies might put people
who are otherwise unemployed to work, and thus stimulate demand and make the
economy operate at a higher capacity. Perhaps even more important, they typically
make highly questionable assumptions about technological progress (as discussed in
more detail in the next section). Such models have never been back-tested against
historical data and their predictive accuracy is highly questionable.
Building on the other work outlined in the FuturICT project in developing an
agent-based model of the world economy, we intend to develop an alternative type of
climate mitigation model. By constructing the model at the level of individual agents
we have far more historical data that can be used to calibrate the model. By making
use of results from behavioral economics we do not need to assume that agents are
rational – we can instead use decision rules that have been calibrated against the
behavior of real people. By collecting and calibrating against an extensive database
on technological change, as described in the next section, we will employ more real-
istic models of technological progress. Most importantly, we do not have to assume
that the economy is in equilibrium. We will study the eﬀects of stimulus for new
technologies, modelling the consequences of putting more people to work and making
progress in new technologies, e.g. possible revolutionary transformations to a green
energy economy.
1.3.6 Technological progess and economic growth
At the same time that modern economic growth theory embraces technological
progress as the agent of change underlying growth, it has traditionally dealt with
it in a very simple way. In a typical economic growth theory a technology is a black
box embodied by a very simple production function. In contrast, Arthur and others
have argued that to understand the patterns of technological progress one needs to
look inside the black box and carefully model its constituents and their interactions
with each other [8,11]. Technologies are recursively built out of other technologies, and
technological change happens in an evolutionary manner: Existing technologies are
recombined and only occasionally are genuinely new technologies created. Indeed, it
has been argued that most innovations result from the speciﬁc demands of producers
for improvements in their production technology. Recent work ([12,80]) models the
way in which the components of a technology depend on each other, and shows that
using simple models for technological improvement, the rate of technological change
and its diﬀusion depend on the interconnectivity and separability of the technology.
In FuturICT we intend to gather detailed information about technologies so that
we can empirically and theoretically study the interaction graphs of technologies.
This could potentially allow us to construct a theory of technological change that
would be completely diﬀerent than present economic theories, and that could have
substantial predictive power about the circumstances required for economic growth.
Indeed, empirical analysis done along these lines already suggests the value of this
approach ([57,58]).
2 State of the art
2.1 Traditional economics
Most of current economic theory is based on the postulates of the agent who is rational
in the following sense of the term. The agent gathers all available information which
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is relevant to a decision. The behavioural decision rule which is then used is that the
agent makes the optimal decision, given the information and given his ﬁxed tastes
and preferences. The decisions of others only aﬀect the agent indirectly via the eﬀects
of such decisions on the set of prices facing agents. Agents operate autonomously and
are not inﬂuenced directly by the decisions of others with their tastes and preferences
held ﬁxed.
With this as the model of agent behaviour, the major challenge of economic theory
from the time of Jevons and Walras in the 1870s was to discover the most general
set of conditions under which an existence proof of general equilibrium could be es-
tablished. In general equilibrium, supply and demand balance in all markets, and
there are no unused resources, so it is eﬃcient in that sense. Important contributions
were made by, for example, von Neumann [81] and Arrow and Debreu [7]. The main
challenge in the decades around 1950 was to prove existence in a world in which time
existed, and the ﬁnal results on this were obtained in by Radner [3]. Shortly after-
wards, it was demonstrated that in general equilibrium no a priori constraints could
be placed on the shape of market demand and supply functions ([37,94]). Further,
that there was no theoretical presumption that factors of production were paid their
marginal products [21]. In short, general equilibrium contains no clear testable propo-
sitions which would enable it to be refuted empirically. A detailed critique is given,
for example, by Kirman [67]; see also [42] for a discussion of the limits and strengths
of equilibrium.
The essential problem which is paramount in the framework that we will develop
is how is aggregate behaviour related to individual behaviour. In other words the
problem is that of aggregation.
In macroeconomics this problem was circumvented by making the assumption that
the aggregate behaved like a rational individual. The representative rational agent
model which is based on this assumption has become the standard tool of analy-
sis. Moreover, modern macro dynamic models assume rational expectations, that is
they assume that all the agents correctly specify the stochastic process that governs
the evolution of the economy. They then ﬁnd equilibria which satisfy this hypothesis
([75,76], for example). As an empirical tool, the model of the economically rational
agent has essentially been the intellectual basis of a great deal of both social and
economic policy. Much of the latter is based on the principle that agents react indi-
vidually and “rationally” to changes in incentives such as tax and beneﬁt rates. Under
the guise of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE), in recent decades the
rational agent has become the foundation of mainstream macroeconomic models as
well ([20,105]). A key development over the past forty years or so has been to incor-
porate imperfect information into this model of rationality. In particular, situations
in which diﬀerent agents have access to diﬀerent amounts of information, so-called
‘asymmetric information’. The pioneers in this ﬁeld were Akerlof [2] and Stiglitz [96].
This relaxation of the assumption that agents have complete information undoubtedly
extends the empirical relevance of the model of the economically rational agents. The
model of economically rational agents operating with imperfect information is the
intellectual basis of the ‘market failure’ approach to economic policy, and speciﬁcally
to regulatory policy, in the past few decades. However, the model is still based on the
assumptions a) that agents have ﬁxed tastes and preferences and behave optimally, b)
that agents operate autonomously and are not inﬂuenced directly in their behaviour
by other agents, and c) that agents have rational expectations.
2.2 Recent developments
Bounded rationality. In the last decades the awareness of the limitations of the
rational paradigm among economists has steadily increased. In fact, these limitations
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have been stressed already in the past by well known economists. For example, Pareto
said that people spent some of their time making non-rational decisions and the rest
of their time rationalising them. Keynes emphasized that “expectations matter” and
stressed the importance of market psychology (“animal spirits”). Simon [93] forcefully
argued that economic man is boundedly rational, unable to compute optimal decisions,
but instead using satisﬁcing rules of thumb. Tversky and Kahnemann [100] showed in
laboratory experiments that individual decisions under uncertainty are much better
described by heuristics, and that these may lead to systematic biases. Schumpeter
and Hayek already had a complexity view of economics with competing strategies and
evolutionary selection. But these ideas did not withstand the rational expectations
revolution in macroeconomics in the 1970s and 1980s.
Adaptive learning. Modern macro economics has also been inﬂuenced by ideas
from bounded rationality (see e.g. Sargent [91]) and studied macro ﬂuctuations under
adaptive learning, where agents use a statistical model and update the parameters
based on observable quantities to form expectations about the future (an extensive
overview is Evans and Honkapohja [39]). Sometimes adaptive learning converges to
rational behaviour, but more often than not it does not do so or, if it does, only
extremely slowly. The latter observation is important because it suggests that most
of the time even if it were theoretically possible, people will not have come to have
“rational expectations” and that therefore it is the situation where this assumption
does not hold that must be analysed.
Behavioural economics is developing alternative models for non-rational behaviour
(e.g. altruistic behaviour, reciprocity, tit-for-tat, etc.) and behavioural game theory
focuses on strategic behaviour which is not fully rational in the standard sense (see
e.g. [30]). Laboratory experiments with human subjects have become a standard tool
to test behavioural models, since one of its founders, Vernon Smith received the Nobel
Prize in Economics 2002 (together with Daniel Kahnemann for studying the role of
psychology in economics); see [33] on the important role of laboratory, ﬁeld and web
experiments within FuturICT. The evidence that people do not obey the standard
axioms of rationality does not mean that we should develop other axioms but rather
base our models on behavioural rules which seem to be consistent with observed
behaviour. Akerlof and Shiller [3] have recently stressed the importance of “animal
spirits” and the urgent need for behavioral economic modelling; see also Colander et
al. [35] for a general critique on the failure of economics in the light of the ﬁnancial
crisis.
Behavioural finance argues that some ﬁnancial phenomena can be understood
using models in which at least some agents are not fully rational (see e.g. Barberis
and Thaler [14]). In particular, Kahnemann and Tversky [65] developed an empirically
supported alternative model, prospect theory, for decisions under risk as an alternative
to traditional expected utility. Prospect theory incorporates psychological eﬀects into
economic decision making, such as the fact that there is an asymmetry between
perceived proﬁts and losses: individuals are less willing to gamble with proﬁts than
with losses. The advantage of the sort of model we propose in FuturICT is that we
do not have to assume that all individuals behave according to prospect theory, for
example, but we can allow for more heterogeneous types of behaviour.
Agent-based models. In the standard eﬃcient market model, the hypotheses of
rationality and homogeneity are normally invoked, so that the agents’ individual
behaviour can be neglected and strategies have all to be equal. As an alternative,
taking individual interactions into account, agent-based models of ﬁnancial markets
have been studied extensively, e.g. the artiﬁcial Santa Fe stock market in Arthur
et al. [9] and LeBaron et al. [71] and the Genoa Artiﬁcial Stock Market (GASM)
[84,85]; see the survey [70]. Simpler, stylized models with essentially the same
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results have been introduced e.g. in Kirman [66], Brock and Hommes [28] and Lux
and Marchesi [78]; see the survey [59]. Many more ABMs in ﬁnance have been de-
veloped and these capture the above mentioned stylized facts nicely (see [77] for a
recent survey).
ABMs have also been developed to describe macro economic ﬂuctuations, e.g. in
Delli Gatti et. al. [38]. In an ABM scenario, empirical macroeconomic regularities
should be expressed in terms of statistical distributions, such as the distribution of
ﬁrms according to their size or growth rate (Steindl [95]). Also, suitable modelling
strategies should be adopted and these should be capable of combining a proper analy-
sis of the behavioural characteristics of individual agents and the aggregate properties
of social and economic structures (Sunder, 2005).
A recent and prominent example of a large-scale artiﬁcial economy has been
developed within the EU-FP6 project Eurace. The model captures a rich scenario
of interactions between real and ﬁnancial variables. This points out the validity of
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) as innovative methodology for the
study of economics. Eurace is a large-scale agent-based model and simulator rep-
resenting a fully integrated macroeconomy consisting of three economic spheres: the
real sphere (consumption goods, investment goods, and labour markets), the ﬁnancial
sphere (credit and ﬁnancial markets), and the public sector (Government and Central
Bank). Following the agent-based approach, Eurace economic agents are character-
ized by bounded rationality and adaptive behavior as well as pairwise interactions
in decentralized markets. The balance-sheet approach and the stock ﬂow consistency
checks has been followed as a key modelling paradigm in Eurace. The computational
results show the real eﬀects on the artiﬁcial economy of the dynamics of monetary
aggregates, i.e., endogenous credit money supplied by commercial banks as loans to
ﬁrms and ﬁat money created by the central bank by means of quantitative easing
[32,86]. In particular, Eurace shows the emergence of endogenous business cycles
which are mainly due to the interplay between the real economic activity and its
ﬁnancing through the credit market, thus shedding light on the relation between
debt, leverage and main economic indicators [86]. Furthermore, Eurace shows that a
quantity easing monetary policy coupled with a loose ﬁscal policy generally provide
better macroeconomic performance in terms of real variables, despite higher price and
wage inﬂation rates [32]. See also [36] for a recent discussion of agent-based macro
model related to Eurace.
One of the standard misconceptions about large agent based models (ABM) is
that they are diﬃcult to calibrate to empirical data. However, the main purpose of
ABM, is rather to be able to reproduce qualitatively some of the salient features of
the real economy. It is not to ﬁt the data in the way that is the ambition of econo-
metricians. For the latter, one can assume that one has a good understanding of the
stochastic process followed by the economy, in which there are a number of relatively
standard tools such as “bootstrapping” available.
One of the standard problems with large agent based models (ABM) is that they
are diﬃcult to calibrate to empirical data. For a number of economists the main pur-
pose of ABM is to be able to qualitatively reproduce some of the salient features of
the real economy.
When the stochastic process is imperfectly known or exhibits non-stationarity the
econometric approach has to be modiﬁed and one can no longer think of a system
converging to equilibrium, (see [34]).
One of the major challenges that FuturICT proposes to meet is to provide ap-
proaches that allow one to ﬁt the data with ABM models even when the stochastic
process is imperfectly known or exhibits non-stationarity and the system does not
converge necessarily to an equilibrium; see e.g. the discussion of an ABM for the
housing market in the Washington DC area in Sect. 3.6.
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2.3 The fundamental limits of mainstream thinking
We recognise that economics has made advances in recent decades, and that it is by no
means a completely empty box. However, to quote again from Jean-Claude Trichet:
“As a policy maker during the crisis, I found the available models of limited help. In
fact, I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional
tools”.
A similar attitude towards the crisis in the autumn of 2008 was adopted by policy
makers in the United States. Olivier Blanchard [20], chief economist at the IMF, had
written in August of that year, only a few weeks before Lehman Brothers failed, that
“For a long while after the explosion of macroeconomics in the 1970s, the field looked
like a battlefield. Over time however, largely because facts do not go away, a largely
shared vision both of fluctuations and of methodology has emerged The state of macro
is good”. The state of macro is good! In August 2008! He went on to say “DSGE
models have become ubiquitous. Dozens of teams of researchers are involved in their
construction. Nearly every central bank has one, or wants to have one”.
Despite this convergence of academic opinion around DSGE models, in the crisis
American policymakers paid no attention to them whatsoever. Instead, they looked at
what happened in the 1930s and tried to avoid those mistakes. So, for example, they
nationalised the main mortgage companies, eﬀectively nationalised AIG, eliminated
investment banks, forced mergers of giant retail banks and guaranteed money market
funds.
It is therefore necessary to move beyond, and in many ways to break decisively,
with the fundamentals of mainstream thinking (e.g. [55]). The rational agent hy-
pothesis is still pervasive in economics, however it might be qualiﬁed by mainstream
practitioners. But the conditions under which the existence of general equilibrium can
be proved ([87]) are so restrictive as to be completely divorced from any empirical
picture of the real world. Human cognitive capacities are known to be bounded ([92]).
In the face of NP-hard optimisation problems, even supercomputers are facing limits
so that optimisation jobs cannot be performed in real time any more (so, for example,
there are 32 pieces at the start of a chess game, but computers have only been able
to solve all possible positions when there are just 6 pieces on the board, and the
computational task scales super-exponentially with the addition of each extra piece).
Above all, it is the equilibrium paradigm and the representative agent approach
which we are intending to replace. From a policy perspective, the eﬃcient market hy-
pothesis has been very important in practice. This hypothesis implies the equilibrium
paradigm. Yet, for example, ﬁnancial markets are systems of extremely many dynam-
ically coupled variables, and it is not at all obvious theoretically that such a system
will have a stationary solution ([73]). If a stationary solution exists, it is not clear that
it is unique ([1]. Further, as is well known since the formulation of the Lotka-Volterra
equations in the 1920s, in systems of non-linearly interacting variables, the existence
of a stationary solution does not necessarily imply that it is stable.
In short, the equilibrium, eﬃcient markets paradigm cannot explains phase tran-
sitions; it does not allow us to understand innovations which occur as a result of
endogenous system dynamics; it does not permit us to study the eﬀects of diﬀerent
time scales of response, when, for example, fast self-reinforcing eﬀects and slow in-
hibitory eﬀects may lead to pattern formation in space and time ([99]), and neglects
friction, without which it is diﬃcult to understand entropy and other path-dependent
eﬀects. To remedy some of the deﬁciencies of the standard equilibrium approach to
economics and the social sciences in general, a number of the partners in FuturICT
are already participating in a project (NESS) on non equilibrium social science (for
details see http://www.nessnet.eu/).
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A common simpliﬁcation in economic modelling is that of the representative agent.
This is certainly a curious assumption to make in the light of the ﬁnancial crisis,
when much of the focus is on the diﬀering behaviors of creditors and debtors. In the
Euro area crisis at the time of writing (November 2011), for example, it makes no
sense at all to speak of the ‘representative agent’, the German government has quite
diﬀerent behavioral rules and constraints from that of, say, the Greek and Italian
administrations.
A fundamental problem with the simplifying assumption of the representative
agent is that it cannot explain the basic existence of economic exchange. As Arrow
pointed out ([6]): “if we did not have [agent] heterogeneity, we would have no trade”.
A similar point was made by Keynes in his 1936 magnum opus, The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money, when he noted that if all agents had identical
expectations, market prices would ﬂuctuate between zero and inﬁnity.
In modern social and economic systems, percolation phenomena are ubiquitous. In
other words, ideas, market sentiments, technologies, viruses spread across networks.
The actual spread of any individual example is not determined so much by the average
node degree, but by very particular features of network structure (e.g. [83]). Moreover,
both specialization and innovation imply the existence of heterogeneous agents, and
the latter in particular cannot be understood using the concept of the representative
agent1.
3 Innovative approach
3.1 Networks
Networks provide a good starting point to visualize any complex system. The economy
can be thought of as a set of overlapping and strongly interacting networks. Some of
the key networks needed to understand the economy in these terms include:
– Production. A good or service is a node, the goods and services required to produce
it are its incoming links, and the goods and services it helps produce are its
outgoing links.
– Firms. Individual ﬁrms are nodes, their incoming links are ﬁrms they invoice, and
their outgoing links are the ﬁrms they get receipts from. This is strongly over-
lapping with the production network described above, but focuses on institutions
rather than goods. One can organize the production and ﬁrm networks based
either on monetary ﬂows or on the ﬂow of physical goods.
– Ownership. This is an inherently bipartite graph, with two types of nodes. One
type of nodes are owners, who can be individuals or ﬁrms, and the other type of
nodes are assets, which can be ﬁrms, commodities, bonds, derivatives, etc.
– Trading. This is closely related to the ownership network and describes with which
other holders owners trade assets.
– Credit. Banks are specialized ﬁrms that lend money to individuals and other ﬁrms.
The credit network is a bipartite graph in which one type of nodes are banks, and
the other type of nodes are the individuals and ﬁrms, including other banks, that
they lend to. Since banks also own assets and hold them as collateral they play a
prominent role in the ownership and trading networks as well.
– Individuals. Ultimately the economy is about individuals, who live in households,
use their labour to produce or supply their labour to ﬁrms, and consume. These
1 For a review of what equilibrium theories have accomplished, what they cannot accom-
plish, and what is needed to go beyond them, see also Farmer and Geanakoplos [41].
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individuals are connected to the networks above in a variety of diﬀerent ways –
they produce and consume goods, work for ﬁrms, invest in ﬁrms, trade in stock
markets (possibly through their pension plans), and receive credit from banks.
While it may be intractable to visually represent all 500 million individuals in the
European Union, this network is the vital conceptual component of any economic
model – the very fact that it exists explains what is meant when we talk of an
economy.
The networks delineated above are not comprehensive. One can reﬁne these, e.g. by
breaking assets down into diﬀerent types, or looking at more specialized networks,
such as the movement of workers between ﬁrms or the network of patent citations
and their relationship to ﬁrms or physical goods.
There are ﬂows of many diﬀerent quantities along the links in the networks above.
For the production network, for example, one can monitor the ﬂow of money, physical
goods, energy, pollutants such as CO2, or critical materials. This makes it easy to
relate economic activity to physical activity and resource constraints – a perspective
that is often missing from conventional economic analyses – and makes this approach
particularly useful for studying sustainability.
Breaking down a system into a set of interacting networks is only the ﬁrst step
in a complex systems analysis, but it can nonetheless be very useful by providing a
schematic view of what the key components of a system are and how they interact. For
example, see the discussion of leverage in Section 3.4 or the discussion of technological
growth in Section 1.3.6. The FuturICT program will gather the data required to
construct all the networks sketched above and more, and will use this representation
as a basic tool for understanding the economy and its instabilities. This will go far
beyond the state of the art – few of these individual networks have been constructed
in any detail, and their interactions have largely never been studied. This will be by
far the most comprehensive view of the world economy ever constructed.
3.2 Market ecology and its role in financial instability
Real agents have cognitive and resource limitations that force them to specialize.
They build up specialized knowledge based on past experience and make most deci-
sions using rules of thumb, without going through the eﬀort of deductively thinking
each situation through from scratch. The diversity of behavior can be enormous. The
ecological approach classiﬁes diﬀerent types of behavior, dividing agents into groups
in order to simplify the study of their interactions and evolution [9,40].
Under this view small deviations from market eﬃciency support an ecology of
interacting ﬁnancial traders. This ecology is supported by the interactions of the
ﬁnancial sector and the real economy: Basic economic functions, such as trading to
get liquidity or oﬀset risks, generate proﬁt-making opportunities. These are exploited
by highly specialized ﬁnancial speculators, who play the role of predators in a ﬁnan-
cial ecology. The diversity of strategies employed is enormous, including fundamental
value investors, technical traders, statistical arbitrage, high frequency trading, and
many others.
As in biology, predators play a valuable role in regulating and maintaining balance.
The introduction of new species can disrupt this balance, destabilizing an ecology
and causing irreversible changes (such as the introduction of rabbits into Australia).
Similarly, ﬁnancial strategies are constantly evolving and new strategies may desta-
bilize the market. For example, the introduction of new mortgage derivative products
and the misunderstanding of these products is widely believed to have played a key
role in triggering the current economic crisis.
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Agent-based modelling and the study of market ecology provide a natural ﬁt.
The agent-based models of LeBaron, for example, suggest that market instabilities
are associated with decreases in the diversity of ﬁnancial traders [69]. This is not
surprising – if there is no diversity in markets, there is no one to take the opposite side
of a position, which can give rise to extreme price movements. FuturICT will collect
data to better study market ecologies, with the goal of developing early warning
signals based on shifts in the proﬁt relationships between strategies and shifts in
market ecology.
3.3 A complex financial market
As an illustration, consider an example of a market, but this time for a ﬁnancial
asset, ([4]). This starts with an empirical phenomenon, the collapse of the price of
asset backed securities early in the current crisis. The paper ﬁrst presents a simple
theoretical model to capture the essence of the phenomenon and then ran simula-
tions of a more general dynamic model in which the agents act in the same way
as in the theoretical model to see if the model evolves to the states predicted by
the theory. The goal was to model the general mechanism whereby investors, as a
rule, trade securities without giving due diligence to fundamental information that
is, they do not check on the toxicity of the asset. The rationale motivating investors,
is simply that it is proﬁtable to adopt this rule, because other investors have already
adopted it.
The market consists of agents, who, in the case of the sub-prime crisis, we can think
of as the banks who were both the issuers and the investors in these Asset Backed
Securities,(ABS). Each agent decides whether or not to follow a rule, which is to
purchase an ABS, relying on signals from the rating agencies, without independently
evaluating the fundamental value of underlying assets. If enough other participants
do so, the agent becomes convinced, not irrationally, that the ABS is highly liquid
and hence easy to trade.
The ABS is toxic, with a certain probability the underlying asset was incorrectly
graded, (the original borrower has already defaulted or has a high probability of doing
so). Agents are linked together with trading partners in a ﬁnancial network. When an
agent receives an oﬀer to buy a new ABS, she considers whether or not to check on
the underlying asset. Each agent now calculates the expected gain to him of checking
given the rules chosen by the neighbours in his network and checks if the expected
pay-oﬀ is higher than that obtained by not checking.
It is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd the equilibria of this simple market, in terms of whether
agents are checking or not, and there are two, one of which is always an equilibrium,
and the other which only appears above a certain critical value for the probability
of default on the underlying asset. In the ﬁrst equilibrium no banks check on the
underlying assets whilst in the second all banks do so. To test the stochastic stability
of the two equilibria simulations were run in which agents noisily learn (they use rein-
forcement learning), whether to check or not. What transpires from the simulations is
that the system always converges to the no-checking equilibrium if the probability of
default is low enough, but a small increase in that probability can lead the market to
collapse into the equilibrium in which everyone checks. Thus a small change in one of
the parameters of the model can lead to catastrophic consequences at the aggregate
level.
Consider Figs. 1(a)–(c). In the ﬁrst we see the probability of default on an ABS
issued at a given time. For each date we see the percentage of loans with a given
date of origin which default after each period. This is steadily rising in Fig. 1(a).
In Fig. 1(b) we see the evolution of the prices of the ABS over time, which remains
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Fig. 1. Critical transition in an agent-based model of asset backed securities (ABS). Top
panel: rising percentage of loans with a given date of origin which default; Middle panel:
prices of ABS are stable, before suddenly collapsing; Bottom panel: critical transition from
not checking to checking equilibrium.
stable and then suddenly collapses after a certain time. Finally in Fig. 1(c) where
on the vertical axis is the proportion of agents not checking, the noisy best response
process is shown collapsing to the checking equilibrium as the probability of default
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increases. If all agents were perfectly rational the process would not leave the no-
checking equilibrium, but even a small amount of noise will cause the no checking
equilibrium to suddenly shift to the one where everybody checks and the toxic assets
are revealed to everyone and the prices collapse. Thus what was examined was the
co-evolution of the default rates on mortgages and the prices of securities backed
by those mortgages. The default rates steadily increased but this was not reﬂected
in the price of assets until they suddenly collapsed and the interbank market froze.
A continuous change at one level led to a discontinuous change at the aggregate level.
Whilst one could establish the existence of the equilibria of the model analytically, it
was necessary to resort to simulations to see to which equilibrium the learning process
converged.
This underlines an important message. As soon as we are interested in real eco-
nomic phenomena we cannot avoid examining how the economy behaves out of
equilibrium and the characteristics of the states through which it passes, or to which
it settles.
Another and very general example of cascading networks which are a source of
systemic risk is given by [74].
3.4 Expectations and learning
In a complex system, individual agents lack the knowledge necessary to fully un-
derstand their environment and compute optimal decision rules. How do individual
agents learn in such an environment and adapt their behaviour as the economy evolves
and how does individual learning co-create aggregate behaviour? An important ques-
tion is the extent to which agents are capable of learning better heuristics in complex
non-equilibrium situations.
A theory of heterogeneous expectations for complex socio-economic systems has
been proposed in Kirman [68] and Brock and Hommes [27]; see Hommes [61] for a re-
cent survey. Agents act purposeful, choose between simple forecasting heuristics and
tend to attach more weight to rules that have been more successful in the recent past.
This theory of heterogeneous expectations has been successfully ﬁtted to laboratory
experiments with interacting human subjects [60].
A key ﬁnding is that in systems with negative expectations feedback, such as the
classical supply driven hog cycle model, subjects are able to coordinate and learn the
rational expectations equilibrium price, even when they have very limited information
about their environment (see [54] and Fig. 2). In contrast, in systems with positive
expectations feedback, such as asset markets driven by speculative demand, agents are
not able to learn the rational expectations price, but instead they coordinate on suc-
cessful and self-fulﬁlling simple trend following strategies causing price ﬂuctuations,
excess volatility and persistent deviations from the rational expectations fundamental
price [60]. These results generalize the initial ﬁndings of [43] that aggregates do not
become “well behaved” if there is interdependence in agents’ preferences or choices.
A simple complexity model thus ﬁts the experimental data both at the micro level of
individual forecasting heuristics and the macro level of aggregate price data. Many
ﬁnancial market and macro systems exhibit positive feedback, and a challenge for
FuturICT is to study heterogeneous expectations in more realistic complex markets
and large web-based experiments.
More and more attention is being paid to situations in which cooperative behav-
iour evolves in situations where game theory suggests that the solution would be for
people to behave in an individualistic way. See for example [24]. One line of reasoning
which will be incorporated into FuturICT models is that of “team reasoning” as in-
troduced in Bacharach [13]. This suggests that people involved in a collective venture
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Fig. 2. Laboratory experiments with negative expectations feedback (left panels) and posi-
tive expectations feedback (right panels) markets. Realized prices in experiments (top panels,
red dots) and simulated prices (top panels, green squares) and corresponding evolution of
fractions of 4 strategies in heuristics switching model (bottom panels). Negative feedback
markets quickly converge to fundamental equilibrium, with adaptive expectations dominat-
ing the market (bottom left panel, purple curve). Positive feedback markets persistently
oscillate, due to good performance and ampliﬁcation by trend following strategies (bottom
right panel, blue and green curves).
may redeﬁne their utility to take account of the welfare of the group. Laboratory
experiments point out the importance of networks in the emergence of cooperation
[50,98]. Cooperation and coordination are, highly important features of modern so-
cieties and economies and the way in which such cooperation emerges and can be
encouraged should be a central theme for FuturICT.
The importance of social learning, of agents altering their behaviour directly as
a result of the behaviour of others, is shown by the tournament reported in [89].
A very simple strategy based upon copying proved the most successful, a result not
anticipated by the experts who designed the tournament: ‘This outcome was not an-
ticipated by the tournament organisers, nor by the committee of experts established
to oversee the tournament, nor . . . by most of the tournament entrants.’
FuturICT will investigate a wide range of behavioural rules of agents based on
diﬀerent types of social learning, individual learning, reinforcement learning, hetero-
geneous expectations models and examine which are more capable of explaining the
key emergent macro-economic properties of the system than others. In addition to
learning models based on principles more familiar to economists, we will draw on mod-
els of social learning behaviour from other social sciences such as anthropology and
cultural evolution, to build an empirically grounded theory of learning and adaptive
behaviour for complex socio-economic systems (for example [18,19,24,26,51,56,90]).
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3.5 Innovative policy and market regulation
A key factor driving the current economic crisis was the excessive use of leverage, i.e.
too much borrowing without proper collateral. John Geanakoplos [46] has documented
and analyzed the leverage cycle, in which leverage increases due to competition dur-
ing times of ﬁnancial stability. The excessive growth of leverage eventually leads to
ﬁnancial instability and triggers a crash; once the ﬁnancial system stabilizes, the cy-
cle repeats itself. The agent-based simulation of the leverage cycle by Thurner et al.
[97] demonstrates this cycle explicitly, and shows how leverage can drive clustered
volatility and heavy tails in ﬁnancial time series. Margin calls, which are made to
limit risk and make good sense from the myopic perspective of individual banks, can
drive systemic risk when too many banks act in unison. This provides an example
of how ﬁnancial innovations, which were in Lord Turner language mistakenly consid-
ered to be “axiomatically beneﬁcial”, may be destabilizing in a complex system with
boundedly rational interacting agents (Brock, Hommes and Wagener, [25]).
What level of leverage is optimal? Basel III sets leverage levels based on rules of
thumb and intuition. The toolkit of FuturICT can potentially make the regulation
of leverage much more scientiﬁc. In a world of complex inter-locking relationships
and contracts, leverage is diﬃcult to even calculate. The proper level for leverage
depends on network relationships such as interbank lending (e.g. [48,49]), which can
provide security in normal times but may amplify the extent of a crash in bad times.
Bank holding companies are highly complex institutions that often have thousands of
independent entities – without understanding the network of ownership and control
(see e.g. [102]), one cannot properly measure leverage; this is essential to understand
what will happen when any given institution is driven bankrupt. The data and net-
work view of FuturICT will make such relationships clearer, and provide a framework
for making sound regulatory decisions.
3.6 Agent-based models as econometric and policy tools
As we have already mentioned, up until now agent-based models in economics have
mainly been qualitative conceptual models. A project to build an ABM for housing
markets in the Washington DC area provides a proof-of-principle that it is possible
to go beyond this to build a model that is carefully calibrated to real data. Some
preliminary results are given in [47], and the results of a typical simulation are shown
in Fig. 3.
This model can be used to make predictions about the housing market condi-
tioned on factors such as interest rates, loan policy, immigration, or unemployment,
or it can be used to investigate changes in policy, such as interest rates or lending
practices.
In this model agents are households who buy and sell houses. Each house is ran-
domly assigned a quality factor based on the distribution of sale prices of real houses,
and the assumption is made that quality remains constant and buyers prefer houses
of higher quality. Every month a fraction of households decide to move and put their
houses up for sale, or attempt to buy a house, e.g. because they decide it is a better
alternative than renting. Sellers drop their prices at regular intervals until they ﬁnd
a buyer or remove their house from the market.
The thing that makes this model unique is that most of the characteristics of the
households, such as income, employment, frequency of moving, etc. are calibrated to
exogenous data. Income, for example, is matched to yearly income distributions from
tax returns (which also provide valuable information about the frequency with which
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Fig. 3. A comparison of an agent-based simulation of the housing market in the Washington
D.C. metropolitan area (solid lines) to real data (dashed lines).
householders move). Census data is used to understand migration and wealth, data
on individual mortgages is used to track loan policy, and data from real estate records
is used to calibrate the strategies sellers use to adjust their prices.
An example showing a typical run of the model is shown in Figure 3. The ﬁrst six
panels compare six diﬀerent outputs of the model to the data for the period of the
simulation from 1997–2010. Many properties of the model do a good job of matching
the data, such as the housing price index, units sold, or days on market. The authors
then investigate counter-factual scenarios to assign causality by simulating how the
market would have behaved diﬀerently had exogenous factors changed. For example,
in the lower left panel we see that if interest rates had been held constant there would
have still been a bubble, but it would have been much smaller. The lower middle
panel shows what would have happened if leverage for buying houses, as measured
by the Loan-To-Value ratio (LTV), had remained constant. In this case the bubble
disappears entirely. Indeed the scenario where both interest rates and LTV are held
constant (lower right) is very similar to the one in which only LTV is held constant.
Thus, this model suggests that the dominant cause of the bubble was the extremely
liberal lending policies that prevailed during the housing market. Such results would
be diﬃcult to achieve with other more traditional methods. This project is still in
its early stages and the results are still evolving as the model is improved, but the
results so far suggest the potential power of this method.
318 The European Physical Journal Special Topics
4 Expected paradigm shifts
A success of FuturICT would constitute a major paradigm shift within the ﬁeld of
economics along at least three dimensions:
1. A new scientiﬁc paradigm of a complexity-network approach to economics, em-
phasizing the idea that the economy is a large but noisy system of interacting
agents who are themselves noisy. What is interesting in such systems is not their
eﬃciency, but their capacity to coordinate;
2. The economic discipline needs to become an empirically falsiﬁable science, both
at the individual and at the aggregate level; see e.g. the experiments discussed in
3.4;
3. A paradigm shift in economic policy, with the development of a “ﬂight simula-
tor” with advanced ICT tools for policy makers to gain experience in pro-active
management of crises in a realistic environment;
4. An analysis of the increased speed of communication on economic activity and
ﬁrms’ growth.
As already discussed, up until now the main methods for macro economic analysis
and forecasting have been econometric and DSGE models. A success in this project
would introduce a third category of model into the standard toolkit. This would be
more than just a technical innovation: It would be a revolution in the way that eco-
nomics is done, and entirely diﬀerent way of thinking about the economy.
In the FuturICT view, economics should become an empirically falsiﬁable science
again, both at the micro and at the macro level. “As if” models at the aggregate
level are insuﬃcient. Instead, the focus will be on interacting agent-models, cali-
brated to individual and ﬁrm speciﬁc data and matching the emerging aggregate
properties, and thus matching both micro and macro data. Simple laboratory macro
experiments, such as those described in subsection 3.3, show that matching micro
and macro behaviour simultaneously is possible. FuturICT will develop methods and
tools to match large individual data sets to individual behavior and at the same time
match aggregate behaviour of complex socio-economic systems.
In a complex economy, such as that which would be depicted by the models de-
veloped in FuturICT, since the consequences of individual choices depend on what all
the others are simultaneously doing, people take actions in an environment charac-
terized by radical or endogenous uncertainty. The aggregate outcomes emerging from
their continuous and asynchronous localized interactions are almost incomprehensible
at an individual level and risk analysis has to be systemic, not individual. In spite of
this, modern market economies display a reasonably coordinated state of aﬀairs most
of the time. For example they stay within a few percentage points of full-employment,
and do not exhibit persistent pathological shortages or surpluses of goods. In other
terms, the macroeconomy is characterized both by a substantial resilience and a deep
fragility.
This opens the way for some fundamental theoretical and policy questions that
FuturICT will address, regarding how built-in feedback mechanisms operate in a com-
plex economy, and how government interventions should both anticipate and react
to them to prevent future crises. As Bernanke said “I just think it is not realistic to
think that human beings can fully anticipate all possible interactions and complex
developments. The best approach for dealing with this uncertainty is to make sure
that the system is fundamentally resilient and that we have as many fail-safes and
back-up arrangements as possible”
(Interview with the IHT May 17th 2010)
In the remaining part of this section we discuss three of the important questions
that arise.
Participatory Science and Computing for Our Complex World 319
In the scenario proposed by FuturICT, economic policy prescriptions have fun-
damentally novel aspects. They stabilize economic system by managing a complex
system with heterogeneous agents who interact through networks. It evokes a pas-
sage similar to that one from chemotherapy to targeted medicine, with individualized
treatment. Two cases: i) network of networks, and ii) immunization strategy or circuit
breakers. Some statistical physicists have recently proposed the concept of networks
of networks [29,72] where they develop a framework for understanding the robustness
of interacting networks subject to cascading failures from one network to another
and vice versa. The FOC project linked to the FuturICT proposal has as its aim to
study the relationship between the structure of these networks and their propensity
to implode (see [16] and [17]). As they point out, it is not enough to look at any of
the single nodes in the network. The case of Bear Stearns is an example of a default
which occurred even though there was a capital cushion well above what is required
to meet supervisory standards calculated using the Basel II standard (Cox, 2008).
To come back to the basic message of FuturICT, regulators have to face the fact
that, in many situations, actions ensuring the soundness of one institution (e.g., sol-
vency, liquidity capacity, etc.) may not be consistent with ensuring the soundness of
another (Crockett, 2000). On the contrary they may even decrease the stability of
the system as a whole. Indeed, local shocks can have systemic repercussions and the
requirement to have sounder individuals can have the counter-intuitive eﬀect to make
the entire system more fragile. It is interesting to note these issues are very common
in the ﬁeld of complex systems, where the network of agent interactions at the mi-
cro level results in the emergence of new behaviour that must be tackled with new
global strategies. To quote FOC, “Such an integrated and network-oriented approach
invoked by regulators does not exist at the moment. This project aims at developing
new indicators that are genuinely constructed with a systemic risk approach starting
from microscopic data and, in particular, taking into account the network of mutual
exposures among institutions”.
Some progress has been made towards obtaining analytical results for the fragility
of a network. Indeed under some simplifying assumptions, exact analytical solutions
have been obtained for the critical fraction of nodes that, when removed, will lead to a
failure cascade and to a complete fragmentation into interdependent networks. They
notice that a broader degree distribution increases the vulnerability of interdependent
networks to random failure, which is opposite to how a single network behaves. We
plan to use the concept of networks of networks in the investigation of the interbank
market and of the credit network. In fact there is a network interaction among banks
and a network interaction among ﬁrms and the credit network among banks and ﬁrms
links the two networks.
Recent papers have shown that connectivity might favor disease spreading, with
domino eﬀects and bankruptcy cascades (reference in Sect. 3.3). FuturICT may en-
visage how to set some circuit breakers which are activated when, e.g., the average
leverage of the actors in a network reaches some critical threshold (two FP7 Euro-
pean projects , FOC and CRISIS, deal with that issue). In a sense, the problem is
that of ﬁnding the best strategy to immunize a population of agents with a mini-
mal welfare loss. It has been accepted that targeted strategies on most central nodes
are most eﬃcient for networks. FuturICT will develop a graph-partitioning strategy,
which requires a minimal wealth injection into the system, by isolating its most fragile
parts.
5 Expected impact
The current economic crisis has reminded us just how important the economy is,
and made us acutely aware of our current lack of understanding and our inability
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to manage it. The ability to avert such crises, or to at least lessen their impact and
manage them better when they occur, will be enormously valuable. On other levels
this project will also have a major impact on science itself, as well as on technology
and competitiveness.
5.1 Impact on science
As already mentioned, the impact of this project on the ﬁeld of economics would
be enormous. Central bankers are actively seeking tools that would give them a
better understanding of the nature of the crises with which they have to deal and
the eﬀectiveness of what they are doing in the short and long run. Many economics
departments throughout the world have focused considerable resources on providing
better tools for central bankers. Regulatory policy analysis is one of the most impor-
tant practical application of economics, and even small improvements can have big
eﬀects. Complex systems analysis and agent-based modelling are so diﬀerent from the
standard approach that a practical success in this domain could trigger a sea-change
in the way economics is done.
At present economics stands out as the branch of science where the study of com-
plex systems has had the least impact. Yet, it is clear that periodic endogenous crises
are an intrinsic feature of modern economies (see Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s “This time is
diﬀerent” [88]). It is at best on the periphery. A success here could bring economists
strongly into the center of the complex systems community.
As should be evident just from the data sets that we envision collecting, the ap-
proach that we are taking is highly transdisciplinary. Demonstrating the practical
value of transdisciplinary approaches would also have a major impact.
Lastly in this connection, we will make the data we collect available (within legal
constraints) to anyone who wishes to work on it. This should be a signiﬁcant advan-
tage for those who need more complete socio-economic data and represents one of the
major advantages of this project for the community at large.
5.2 Impact on technology and competitiveness
We envision using state of the art software and hardware to achieve our goals. One of
these goals is to develop standard libraries of software tools for agent-based modelling.
This could drive software capable of both rapid prototyping and rapid execution.
As it currently stands the United States completely dominates the ﬁeld of eco-
nomics. The US has given almost no support to applications of complex systems in
economics, in particular agent-based modelling. A success in this area could turn
Europe into the leader of the ﬁeld.
Science depends on funding, and science funding depends on the economy. As
argued below, even a minor success in improving our ability to manage the economy
is worth an enormous amount, which ultimately impacts science research budgets in
every ﬁeld.
5.3 Impact on society
The current crisis has already cost the world an enormous amount, and may yet cost a
lot more. Trillions of euros were lost, unemployment soared, and the European Union
came under severe stress. The stakes are very high – if this project could mitigate
even one percent of the losses, this translates into tens of billions of euros, which
would be an ample return on the investment in a ﬂagship project.
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We sometimes forget that almost everything depends on the economy. Economic
performance translates directly into human suﬀering. Poor economic performance
means high unemployment, and it also means less money for social services, and lower
budgets for the arts and sciences. It is no coincidence that Da Vinci and Michelangelo’s
coincided with the domination of Florence by the Medici (who directly supported their
work).
Finally, a FuturICT Flagship would be a way to assure citizens that the stability
and improvement of socio-economic system is one of the main worries of governments,
worthy of their attention and one of the main scientiﬁc challenges to be addressed in
the ﬁrst big science project in the socio-economic sciences.
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